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reek policy-makers like to make the point that their economy cannot recover because 
of a lack of credit. The argument that a lack of credit is among the root causes of the 
continuing recession in Greece is applied to exports, in particular, whose growth has 
been disappointing. Austerity is an easy explanation for the weakness of domestic demand, 
but it is more difficult to explain why Greek exports have stagnated in recent years, even 
though wages have fallen by over 20%. Greek exporters have thus become much more 
competitive and should have been able to increase their export sales. But this has not been the 
case. Greek exports (if calculated on a proper value-added basis) are barely higher now than 
just before the crisis. This is surprising, because Portugal – another programme country with 
a similar income per capita – has been able to increase its exports by over 30%, although wages 
in that country have not fallen. The only explanation that might fit this observation is that 
Greek exporters were starved of credit, whether for working capital or for investment in new 
exporting activities. 
The macro-data does not fit this facile explanation, however. Overall, credit has not really 
fallen, at least relative to GDP, and interest rates on loans to non-financial corporations did not 
increase during the crisis. 
The thesis that a credit crunch is holding back the Greek economy should imply that overall 
credit has fallen, at least relative to GDP, which is a good indicator of credit demand. But this 
has not been the case. The ratio of overall credit (not just bank credit) to non-financial 
corporations as a % of GDP has actually increased in Greece over the last few years. 
Figure 1 shows this ratio for both Greece and Portugal.  It is apparent that the credit intensity 
of Portugal is much higher than that of Greece. A priori, one would have expected that the 
credit crunch associated with the bailout programme would have hit the Portuguese economy 
harder than the Greek one, which seems to depend less on credit. But this did not happen. 
Moreover, it is apparent that since the bailout programme started the ‘credit intensity’ of the 
Greek economy has actually increased, which is not compatible with an economy that cannot 
expand due to insufficient credit. 
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Figure 1. Credit to NFC as % of GDP 
 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. 
Portugal shows that a recovery is possible, even with a stagnating credit ratio. But this is not 
an exceptional case. It is well known a financial boom and bust is often followed by what is 
called a ‘credit-less recovery’.1 This happened in Portugal (with a higher credit intensity) – 
why not in Greece? 
One explanation might be the very high-risk premia on Greek government paper that arose 
around the de facto default of 2012. In general, banks charge more for their loans than the 
amount the government has to pay on its debt. But this has not been the case in Greece since 
the crisis started.   
Figure 2, below, shows the interest rate on government Greek government debt and the 
interest rates charged by Greek banks to (Greek) non-financial corporations (NFCs). The data 
reveals that in Greece NFCs were already paying a high interest rate (3-6%) during the boom 
period, demonstrating that high interest rates did not curtail credit demand while the boom 
was ongoing. But during the recession (and the entire bailout period) interest rates charged by 
banks to the domestic (non-financial) corporate sector barely increased, although government 
bond yields increased to double-digit rates. Domestic NFCs were thus able to (re-)finance 
themselves during most of this period at much lower rates than the Greek government. Even 
at the peak of the crisis Greek banks charged their non-financial corporate customers less than 
they had done before the crisis. 
                                                   
1 See, for example: S. Claessens, M. Ayhan Kose, M. E. Terrones (2009), “A recovery without credit: 
Possible, but…”, Voxeu.org, 22 May 2009 (www.voxeu.org/article/creditless-recoveries-what-do-we-
know), and A. Abiad, G. Dell’Ariccia, and B. Li (2011), “What Have We Learned about Creditless 
Recoveries?”, International Monetary Fund. 
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Figure 1. Interest rate, Greece 
 
Sources: Bank of Greece and ECB Statistic Data Warehouse. 
Note: The time series on interest rates on new business loans are available only for few points in time 
over the period considered, this is why outstanding loans are shown. Yet there is no substantial 
difference between the two interest rates.  
Interest rates did therefore operate as an allocation mechanism for credit and investment, at 
least at the macro-economic level. Non-price mechanisms, such as rationing, must have played 
a key role. 
The overall availability of credit and the interest rates are thus not compatible with the credit 
crunch story. However, it is still possible that some sectors, and exports in particular, were 
hampered by a lack of credit, for example because banks might not have been able to redirect 
credit from the non-tradable to the tradable sector. 
Unfortunately the data on credit to exporting firms is not separately available for Greece. 
For Portugal this data exists (see Figure 3, below), and it shows that the total amount of credit 
to exporting firms increased by about 15%, whereas the amount of credit to non-exporting 
firms fell by over 20%. This shows that the banking system in Portugal was able to facilitate 
the adjustment by redirecting the limited amount of available credit away from non-traded 
activities towards exports. 
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Figure 2. Loans to exporting firms, Portugal 
 
Source: OECD Economic Surveys, Portugal, 2014, Figure 5, p. 17. 
This does not seem to have happened in Greece. The sparse data suggests that the allocation 
of bank credit did not facilitate the adjustment towards export-led growth and that even where 
credit was available activity did not increase.   
For example, Table 1, below, shows that since 2010 (bank) credit to small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) increased slightly, whereas credit to larger firms fell by over 40%. Given 
that the bulk of exports comes from larger firms this suggests that the anecdotal evidence of a 
credit crunch for exporters might be correct: credit to large firms was indeed curtailed 
massively.  
Table 1. Credit to SMEs and larger firms 
 Credit growth to NFC (% change) 
 2010-2015 
Total NFCs -25.1 
Non-SME NFCs -41.8 
SMEs 1.8 
Source: Bank of Greece. 
The data on credit by economic activity confirms a mixed picture. 
Table 2, below, shows the growth rate of credit to different sectors. The last-but-one column 
shows 2015 (August) relative to 2010 (also August). The decline in credit to manufacturing was 
somewhat smaller than the overall decline in credit to the corporate sector, which could be 
taken as another sign that the credit crunch was not the main factor holding back exports (of 
goods). Another interesting observation is that credit to the tourism sector actually increased 
(slightly) during the programme years. But tourism exports did not increase much (until this 
year). It is thus difficult to argue that tourism exports were held back by a credit crunch. 
Real estate activities represent another surprise since credit to this, relatively small, sector 
actually increased considerably. This is a non-tradable sector that should have been in decline. 
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Table 2. Growth in bank credit by economic sector 
 Percentage change Share in 
total 
 2014-2015 2010-2015 2005-2010 2015 
Total -2.8 -20.1 77.7 100 
Agriculture -5.7 -35.5 27.1 1.8 
Manufacturing, Mining and Quarrying 0.5 -15.2 39.6 26.5 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply -1.6 6.4 121.6 6.1 
Construction -2.2 -6.7 142.6 12.9 
Trade -5.2 -29.6 65.2 23.8 
Accommodation and food service activities 
(Tourism) -3.7 1.3 70.3 9.5 
Information and communication -10.9 -9.2 NA 3.1 
Real estate activities -6.2 27.2 NA 5.8 
Professional, scientific, technical, administrative 
and support activities 2.8 -9.4 NA 4.2 
Other -2.8 -60.1 143.7 6.3 
Source: Bank of Greece. 
All in all it is difficult to argue that the Greek economy could not recover via export-led 
growth because of a credit crunch.  The overall availability of credit was higher than GDP, 
and interest rates remained relatively low. There is some indication of a misallocation of bank 
credit. But the responsibility for any mistakes in this direction must lie squarely with the 
government and the Troika, given that the Greek banking system has been under 
government control since 2012. 
